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RIGHT OF CONDEMNATION FOR MUNICIPAL
OFF-STREET PARKING
During the past few years, municipalities have become increasingly
concerned with the growing number of cars on the streets and the resulting
parking problem. In their efforts to alleviate this problem, municipalities
have sought to condemn private property for parking facilities. A municipal corporation has no iniierent power of eminent domain and can only
excerise such power when expressly authorized by statute.'
Aside from
general eminent domain statutes, the legislature may enact what are
called "Off-Street Parking Acts" specifically granting the city power to
condemn property for off-street parking. 2 By 1945, twenty-two states
and the District of Columbia had enacted laws providing for off-street
parking facilities.-" In some states, the general eminent domain statute
provides that a city may enact an ordinance enabling the taking of prop4
erty for parking facilities.
The right of a municipality to use eminent domain proceedings arises
only where property is to be taken for a public purpose, and of course
the person whose property is taken must be paid a just compensation for
that property.5 In this respect, the right of eminent domain is to be
distinguished from the exercise of the police power of the state. Police
power may authorize the taking and destruction of property without
compensation to the owner, if such exercise is reasonable and promotes
the general welfare of the citizens of the state.6 Thus the exercise of
police power depends upon reasonableness, while eminent domain proceedings depend on a showing of public purpose.The words "public use" or "public purpose" have a changing meaning
and are not static. s The test of what is a public use is not based so much
on the function being performed( as upon the peculiar circumstances involved in each case.' 0 The fact that the legislature has enacted a parking
statute seems to raise a presumption that public use is involved."
However, this question is not alone a legislative one but a judicial question as
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Some courts have said it is a question of law for the court and
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Courts have taken judicial notice of the increasing number of automobiles on the street and the resulting traffic congestion in determining
whether public parking facilities are for a public use.' 4 No case can be
found which holds that off-street parking cannot possibly qualify as a
public use. The important question seems to be how the facilities are
operated, and the cases on the subject indicate the courts will consider
any fact which throws light on the subject in deciding whether a municipality has properly preserved the public use aspect of the operation of
the parking facilities. The stricter the control set up by the statute the
more likelihood there will be that the court will find a public use rather
than a private use.1 5 The fact that an Off-Street Parking Act leaves the
details of operation to the discretion of the municipality governed by the
local conditions does not render the statute unconstitutional unless for
some other reason the statute does not preserve the public purpose.' 0 Of
course the mere fact that the parking lot does serve the public will not
prevent the court from holding that the taking was illegal if the city has
not complied with the requirements of the statute.1 7 The functions performed in the operation of the parking facility, depending on local considerations, must be logical, necessary, and natural, to the purposes of the
enabling act.
The judiciary has been very liberal in deciding whether the city has
acted within the bounds of eminent domain and off-street parking statutes.
For example, the fact that the city has property down the street that
could be used for a parking lot does not detract from the purpose or
necessity of taking other property.18 Alternatives make no difference, and
one court has held that the city need not decide until after it gets title
to the property whether or not it will be used for a parking lot.5" If the
city condemns privately owned parking lots in order to build a parking
ramp, this is not unreasonable or arbitrary even though the owners had
plans to expand their facilities, to include a parking ramp. 20 However,
even though the statute provides that a municipality may purchase land
inside or outside the city limits if the city council passes an ordinance to
that effect, the mere passage of the ordinance is not conclusive of the
2
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will be closely scrutinized in deciding whether the public use aspect is
being preserved. Leasing of the facility to a private operator does not
destroy the public use aspect, if the city through proper provision in the
lease provides that the public use aspect will be preserved, even if some
private benefit is being conferred on the lessee.2 2 The lease must be for
a definite period-3 and should specify certain minimum1 controls that the
city will exercise after the lease is executed, among them the following:
A lease which provides that the lessee will rent all the facilities acquired
by the city in the future is invalid as an attempt of one city council to
bind the future councils.

'-'4

Provisions that the lessee agrees to rebuild

any facilities destroyed by fire is unreasonable unless the council is given
the opportunity to determine whether the facility should be rebuilt, since
subsequent governing bodies might resolve that such facilities could no
longer serve the public p1Irpose. 2 , " If the arrangements for operation do

not insure against discrimination, or the city does not set minimum rates
to be charged, these shortcomings may be indicative of private rather
than public use.2 6 But a low minimum rate set by the city may be
enough to indicate city supervision over the rates.2 7 If the Off-Street
Parking Act provides that a certain amount of space can be used for
private shops, the fact that the lessee is making partly-private use of the
facility does not detract from the over-all public use aspect. Presumably
this does not make the act unconstitutional.28 The courts are inclined to
look into every provision of the leasc in considering whether the public
use aspect is being preserved.
Any citizen has a basic common law right to bring an action to
enjoin the use of public property for a private use, and to enforce the
public duties owed.2" . This includes any taxpayer1m and plaintiff need
not show any substantial personal interest to get standing to sue. For
this reason the cases on the subject reveal many kinds and classes of
plaintiffs.
The largest class
demned for off-street
the proeprty on the
Other plaintiffs may
operation of parking

of plaintiffs are those whose property is being conparking lots, 3 1 and who directly attack the taking of
grounds that it will not be used for a public use.
attack some phase of the proposed taking or the
lots indirectly, raising the question of whether the
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NOTES

Jublic use is being preser'd. These plaintiffs include; (a) Citizens protesting the iSSuance of bonds for such a purpose:: 2 (b) Businessmen against
whom taxes are being assessed for the improvement in their area; 33 (c)
Businessmen attacking the operation of parking lots and ramps on the
grounds that such a facility only benefits those people whose businesses
are in close proximity to the faculty, indicating that a private rather than
a public purpose is being preserved; ' 4 (d) Citizens whose property was
to be condemned and the proceedings were later abandoned;3 5 (e) Persons seeking to stop the city from entering into a contract with a private
contractor for the construction of a parking ramp;3 0 (f) Plaintiffs who
want damages for property not actually taken, on the grounds that such
property which is used in conjunction with other property will be worthless for its present use; 3 7 (g) Parking lot operators who have attacked
the taxing of private lots where public lots leased to private operators
are not taxed becatse of the public function heing performed.38
There have been no cases reported in Wyoming on the subject of offstreet parking. Under § 1-173, W.S. 1957, a municipality may condemn
property for public purposes "including streets, alleys or public highways
as sites for public buildings, or for any public purpose." If the statute
were amended to specifically include off-street parking, this would go far
to establish that a public use was involved. Such an amendment should
include: (1)maximum length of leases, (2) minimum rates to be charged,
(3) possible sizes of parking lots varying with the population of the city
in which they are located, (4) the amount of space of such city-operated
parking lots that can be used for private purposes, such as private shops
etc., (5) a city may issue bonds for such a purpose. From what has been
said above, however, a condemnation under such an amendment might
still be subject to challenge on the grounds that the use was private.
Such legislative action would raise a presumption that public purpose
would be served by the construction of parking facilities. However, the
city can avoid any argument that the parking lot is not being used for a
private purpose only by adequate control over the facility after it is put
ROBERT A. DARLING
into operation.
THE AESTHETIC AS A FACTOR CONSIDERED IN ZONING
Emphasis on the nature of beauty and good taste was of definite
concern to philosphers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel and today it
remains a vital subject for legal speculation.' This is particularly true in the
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